For half a million 'Syrian' Ottoman subjects living outside the empire, the First World War initiated a massive political rift with Istanbul. Beginning in 1916, Syrian and Lebanese emigrants from both North and South America sought to enlist, recruit, and conscript immigrant men into the militaries of the Entente. Employing press items, correspondence, and memoirs written by émigré recruiters during the war, this article reconstructs the transnational networks that facilitated the voluntary enlistment of an estimated 10,000 Syrian emigrants into the armies of the Entente, particularly the United States Army after 1917. As Ottoman nationals, many Syrian recruits used this as a practical means of obtaining American citizenship and shedding their legal ties to Istanbul. Émigré recruiters folded their military service into broader goals for 'Syrian' and 'Lebanese' national liberation under the auspices of American political support.
Is it often said that the First World War was a time of unprecedented military mobilization. Between 1914 and 1918, empires around the world imposed powers of conscription on their subjects while also placing new demands on civilian life to make provision for total war. In the Ottoman empire, these pressures produced some of the highest mortality rates seen beyond the battlefield: of the 2.8 million troops in the Ottoman army, an estimated 400,000 perished not in combat but because of insufficient provisioning and disease.
1 Poor conditions and rumours French, Canadian, and American armies. Émigré activists promoted enlistment with the Entente as a means of accomplishing Syria's independence from the Ottomans. And enlist they did: an estimated 10,000 ethnic Syrians had joined the United States army by 1918, many of them former Ottoman nationals. 8 Smaller numbers of Syrians also volunteered for the Frenchled Légion d'Orient and the Canadian Expeditionary Forces.
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Syrian émigré recruiters presided over a transnational, largely clandestine mobilization project that produced a lateral traffic in volunteers between immigrant communities in the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere in the Americas. The soldiers whom they raised navigated a complicated legal terrain between the Ottomans and the Entente, and they depended on a sophisticated network of recruiters to help them acquire the new passports, visas, and naturalization documents they needed to enlist. Recruiters mediated between foreign governments and a growing pool of Syrian migrants to exact favourable terms for their men. Syrians living in the diaspora widely saw military service as a practical means of achieving a post-Ottoman nationality status, particularly after the United States entered the war on 6 April 1917 and extended citizenship rights to foreign-born volunteers the following year. Syrian men who deployed (almost always to European, not Ottoman, fronts) described their status as a partnership with America fighting for Syrian liberation. Theirs was a multi-layered and flexible patriotism that allowed soldiers to become 'Syrian' and 'American' simultaneously through service and action. 10 The enlistment of Syrian migrants required a significant amount of work: medical testing, the provision of new travel documentation, and often changes in nationality to ensure the process's legality. Each facet brought recruiters into close relationships with foreign government officials, most notably the French Foreign Ministry and (in 1917) the US Department of State. At the same time, the Syrian agents who managed the process of recruiting, screening, and transporting new volunteers to enlistment sites worked clandestinely, in liminal legal spaces that the Entente powers informally sanctioned but did not oversee. Consequently, examining Syrian enlistment practices requires investigating the correspondence, press clippings, and memoirs of individual recruiters, soldiers, and their agents, most of whom worked beyond the archival confines of the state. Employing these materials, this article tracks the movement of Arabophone Ottoman emigrants from Greater Syria (including Mount Lebanon and Palestine) into military collaboration with the Entente. The recruiters and soldiers discussed here belonged to one of four groups: Ottoman nationals in diaspora, 'Syrian' foreign residents in the Americas with incomplete naturalization status, naturalized Syrian Americans, and second-generation Syrian Americans born abroad. Where Syrian volunteers fell on this scale bore consequences for their ability to enlist, creating obstacles that recruiters confronted on a case-by-case basis.
These recruiters promoted Syrian participation in Allied efforts in the belief that the war would liberate their Middle Eastern homeland from Ottoman rule, an idea deployed similarly by British, French, and American policymakers. 11 Although such sentiments would later be touted as evidence of an authentic nationalist spirit in the diaspora, the reality was that this wartime activism was neither purely sentimental nor entirely nationalist in content.
Military mobilization was a political act that recruiters linked closely with ideas about Syria's liberation from the Ottoman government. It was not just about patriotic sentiment, longing, or an emotional connection to the homeland, however, but about the definitive action they inspired. 12 This distinction is important because, by casting new patriotic responsibilities upon emigrant men on behalf of 'martyred Syria', recruiters did not merely 'imagine' the existence of a Syrian (as opposed to an Ottoman) national community. 13 Rather, they worked towards Syria's armed reclamation from Istanbul and used the enlistment campaign to build partnerships with foreign governments to enforce it. These were not Syrian exiles engaged in collective nostalgia; they were Syrians abroad, dynamic participants in a transnational politics that joined Syria to its diaspora, the Mashriq to the mahjar, and which outlived the 1918 armistice.
Working with the Entente placed Syrian recruiters and soldiers alike into a difficult, unsettled legal space between the Ottoman empire and its enemies. Whether these men would be remembered as patriots or traitors depended largely on the war's outcome, and Ottoman nationals fighting for the Allies risked the possibility of statelessness as thanks for their efforts. The French, Canadian, and American governments all readily offered travel documents to their foreign volunteers, but concerns about fighters' nationality status lingered until the United States offered them unfettered access to US citizenship in 1918. As shall be seen, a documentary hierarchy emerged among recruiters as they promoted service with America as a means of shedding one's Ottoman nationality.
14 Recruiters helped enlistees obtain passports and documentation to distance themselves from the Ottoman empire, which formally claimed them as subjects, but Syrian emigrants also expressed fears that joining the military would open them up to prosecution by Turkish authorities. On the one hand lay charges of treachery; on the other, American nativist accusations of immigrant cowardice, 'slackerism', or disloyalty. Syrian enlistees faced a difficult legal quandary, which one prominent recruiter described as being caught 'between treason and cowardice' (bayna al-khiyana wa-l-jabana): simultaneously compelled and forbidden to join the fight, many remained in a liminal station between Ottoman and American citizenships, fuelling wider conversations about political belonging in the diaspora. 15 As Syrian
American troops were shipped abroad in 1918, the Syrian press published soldiers' images, biographies, and letters home, using them as material evidence of their patriotism and of the diaspora's political contract with the Entente. Nationalist political parties used the soldiers as symbols, folding them into Wilsonian narratives about self-determination through service and action. The connection between soldiering and nationalism persisted through to the 1918 armistice, but Syrian American troops also objected to political uses of their personal legacy. 
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Although the CCS was perhaps the diaspora's most popular nationalist movement during the war, Ghanim's influence waned swiftly in 1919 as France endorsed the creation of a Lebanese state (the Grand Liban) at the expense of CCS demands for territorial unity.
Although the Légion d'Orient had been Ghanim's idea, both 'Syrianists' and 'Lebanists' recruited for the corps and claimed the legionaries as symbols of their alliance with France. 24 Indeed, the diaspora's most successful recruiters did not share Ghanim's politics: in New York City, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, a political party called the Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya (the Lebanon League of Progress) provided most of the Légion d'Orient's recruitment services (see Figure 1) . 25 Like the CCS, the Lebanon League endorsed French tutelage, but they also lobbied for the creation of a Lebanese state distinct from Syria. The party's leaders, the prominent Lebanists Naʿum Mukarzil in New York City and Shukri al-Khuri in São Paulo, worked with the CCS but otherwise described Ghanim as a political rival. Although trenchant and intensifying ideological divisions between Syrianist and Lebanist leaders later boiled over in 1918, the difficult work of diasporic recruitment demanded that they collaborate, and they did so on the shared, practical belief that 'France will liberate [our] country and break the heavy Turkish yoke that has treated us so severely, subjecting us to famine and starvation'. All of the work of vetting new soldiers was done in New York, save for the act of enlisting itself, which happened upon arrival in France. Citing its own neutrality in the war, the US Department of State allowed the recruitment (but not the enlistment) of foreign troops on its soil. 30 The process's piecemeal nature and its management by private émigré recruiters made New York City a locus for the diaspora's mobilization, but it also created opportunities for enterprising migrants seeking free passage across the Americas or to Europe. 31 Simon Jackson points out that the Légion d'Orient suffered attrition as recruits occasionally deserted upon arrival in France.
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The Lebanon League of Progress printed daily calls for recruits in Mukarzil's newspaper in New York City, al-Huda (Guidance); similar announcements appeared in Abu al-Hawl (The Sphinx ), the party's São Paulo organ. The call to arms placed emigrant soldiers within a very specific political project:
For recruitment and jihad in the name of humanity. Pay heed, oh sons of Lebanon! The Turks are dividing your land … it is our goal to expel the Turks from Syria, to cut 
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The Lebanon League managed a lateral traffic in recruits moving across the Americas for mobilization purposes. Even with the provision of passports, transatlantic passage, and guaranteed diplomatic protections, the League's return on recruitment was more trickle than torrent. The Syrian legionaries never amounted to more than 550 in a predominantly Armenian force. This publication looks favourably on Syrian and Lebanese volunteerism for the homeland's recovery … but it also supports Syrian and Lebanese volunteers being deployed to alternative fronts and battlefields. If compelled to duty, we will report to the African Sahara, the European trenches, or anywhere else, for we have one single purpose, and that is to fight until freedom (hurriyya) is victorious. Most of these troops were levied in the largest compulsory draft in American history: the Selective Service draft of 1917. President Wilson's commitment to fighting 'for the liberation of nations and oppressed peoples around the world' against 'the spirit of autocracy that has shattered the weak peoples under its yoke' prompted Syrian immigrants to support the call to arms and, over the course of the war, the president would become one of the most revered personalities for Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab nationalists alike. 44 In the United States, the same newspaper editors who endorsed America's war effort also led the first campaigns to enlist Syrians in the army: Naʿum Mukarzil (al-Huda), Shukri Bakhash (al-Fatat (Youth)), Ibrahim al-Khuri and Wadiʿ Shakir (Fatat Boston, al-Fatat's sister publication), among others. Of course, the draft's implementation immediately raised questions about Syrian eligibility for military service. While recruiters saw Syrian enlistment in the US army as a natural extension to work already being done with America's allies, the US Provost Marshal, Enoch Crowder, was reticent about including Ottoman nationals in the army's ranks. Could Syrian immigrants be compelled to serve? What about those who retained their Ottoman nationality and were thus neutral allies of America's German enemy? Like native-born American citizens, all foreign-born immigrants and foreign nationals were required to register with the Selective Service boards, which then chose eligible men for compulsory military service. Unnaturalized foreign-born registrants were classified in one of three categories: declarant (having submitted a Declaration of Intent, the first papers required of immigrants seeking to naturalize), non-declarant (retaining a foreign nationality), or enemy alien. Enemy aliens were, by virtue of international law, ineligible for the draft: these men 'would not be compelled to serve … since they would be in a position of fighting their own countrymen'. 45 But the legal standing of Ottoman nationals remained particularly murky, especially for Ottoman non-declarants. Because the United States never declared war on the Ottoman empire, Ottoman subjects living in the country became 'neutral allies of the enemy'. Like enemy aliens, 'neutral allies of the enemy' could not be compelled to serve, but they could volunteer or otherwise opt into service if mistakenly drafted. On the face of it, this granted Ottoman immigrants a legal status distinct from that of German, Austrian, or Czech immigrants. 46 In practice, however, Syrian non-declarants were routinely dismissed from the army, misclassified in draft documents as 'alien enemies' alongside other groups of ineligible foreigners. This practice was so common that some Syrian draftees successfully evaded the draft (or received early discharge from service) by invoking 'alien enemy' status.
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Such ambiguities surrounding the military eligibility of Ottoman immigrants worried Syrian recruiters as they sought to widen (not contract) the pool of available troops.
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Not to be outdone by the draft's classification scheme, recruiters found room to navigate the process and place men in the US army. A common strategy involved starting the naturalization process just prior to enlistment. In al-Huda newspaper, Mukarzil reported that, although all Syrian men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one must register with the Selective Service Board, only those bearing their 'first papers' (that is, a Declaration of Intent) would be eligible for voluntary induction. A recent court case, Dow vs. United States (1915), had assured Syrian immigrants access to US citizenship. Mukarzil argued that, by submitting their first papers before registering with the Selective Service Board, Syrian men would bolster their citizenship petitions by serving America as declarant immigrants as opposed to 'neutral allies of the enemy'. Citing new legislation which distinguished between 'Lebanonites or Syrians claimed by Turkey as a subject' and ethnic Turks, he pointed out that military service was the first step towards US citizenship. 'The war has prompted the American government to distinguish the Syrians and Lebanese from those who are clearly Turks', he admonished his readers.
49 For Mukarzil, this was evidence that Americans saw Syrian and Lebanese aspirations for independence as legitimate and would support them. Mukarzil did not mention the religious connotations behind these labels in his editorial, but it is worth noting that, in American legal parlance, the conflation of 'Turk' with Muslim and 'Syrian' with Christian was never far from the surface. Another outcome of Dow v. United States was the creation of a 'Syrian' ethnicity that was racially white, Christian, and eligible for 
51 Such a change, he argued, would transform Syrian soldiers into American citizens overnight, mitigating legal problems arising from their option to serve. The idea to offer citizenship to Syrian volunteers fell on deaf ears in 1917, and Provost Marshall Crowder remained wary of the diplomatic issues that instant naturalization could raise. In May 1918, the army would revise its enlistment policies in just this way, but until that time the majority of Syrian volunteers levied were either second-generation Syrian Americans (American citizens by virtue of birth) or long-time declarants who took the final step to naturalize as they joined the army. Recruiters for the Légion d'Orient and the US army competed for immigrant attentions throughout 1917, and Mukarzil, Bakhash, and their partisans filtered manpower through US, French, and Canadian channels on the basis of citizenship status and soldiers' preferences about destination.
'Every day, a speech:' campaigns for emigrant recruitment, 1917-18 52 After President Wilson declared war, the Syrian diaspora hosted several mass recruitment fairs, complete with public square meetings and bathed in a multivalent discourse about patriotism with the feel of a carnival. In the United States, al-Huda, al-Fatat, and Fatat Boston newspapers celebrated deployed soldiers, and fraternal organizations hosted festivals open to the community at large. At these meetings, token Syrian soldiers appeared in uniform and shared their experiences with the crowd; the emigrant community's rich supply of poets, playwrights, and journalists followed up with speeches. The Lebanon League of Progress sponsored one such rally in Boston in May 1917. Some 2,000 Syrian and Lebanese immigrants attended, among them the rector of Brooklyn's Our Lady of the Cedars Maronite Church, Joseph Yazbek, the Syrian American Club (al-Muntada al-Suri al-Amriki) recruiter and Fatat Boston editor, Wadiʿ Shakir, and the French consul, Joseph Flamand. The mass meeting featured speeches about Syrians' patriotic obligation 'to enlist under the Stars and Stripes, and to fight for the greatest democracy in the world'. 53 One of the community's enlisted men, Elias F. Shannon, appeared in uniform and addressed other second-generation Syrians.
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The immigrant press cast Syrian recruitment in the language of patriotic duty, and other forms of immigrant patriotism -reprinting of propaganda from the Committee for Public Information, advertisements for Liberty Loans, and promotion of President Wilson's war aims -appeared alongside hagiographic accounts of Syrian soldiers. Next to enlistment in the army, purchasing Liberty Loans was the best way to 'prove that you are 100% American', as a 1918 advertisement in al-Nasr (The Eagle) newspaper put it. 55 Syrian displays of pro-Entente patriotism signalled the community's proud participation in American political life, but they also included a second register, joining support for American war aims with the liberation of the Syrian homeland. The Syrian community's recruitment campaigns employed the language of Wilsonian self-determination, and 'establishing the right of peoples to determine their future' in Syria and Mount Lebanon remained the primary goal.
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Enlisting in the US army on behalf of Syrians still 'under the Turkish yoke' became an explicitly political act, reframing 'Syrian' (or 'Lebanese') identity into nationalist categories. In this sense, military mobilization was one of the clearest ways that the emigrants (to borrow Akram Khater's phrasing) 'became "Syrian" in America' through service and action. 59 In New York City, the Lebanon League of Progress called young men to action as a matter of patriotism and masculine duty. Second-generation Syrian Americans played a unique role in soliciting manpower from their communities. As American-born children with Syrian parents, these young men held US citizenship by virtue of birth. Eager to boost its voluntary enlistment numbers, the army sent these men back into their communities as recruiters before deploying them abroad. One of these young men was twenty-three-year-old Albert Hatem (see Figure 4) . In addition to being the nephew of Naʿum Hatem (a respected Syrian American author in Brooklyn), Albert was an heir of Hafid ʿId Hatem, a deputy in Mount Lebanon's governing Administrative Council before the war. 60 Western Front, including Tanyus al-Najjar, Mihkaʾil ʿAzzar, and Bishara Maʿluf. Hatem's colleague, Yusuf ʿAbdu, reported to al-Fatat newspaper that the church also gave them a substantial cash donation for Syrian famine relief. 
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country what is asked of him.' 63 The justness of America's involvement provided additional The clergy's involvement influenced the communal composition of Syrian immigrant enlistees: the Légion d'Orient was widely seen as a Maronite project, while enlistment in the US army stoked competition between Orthodox and Maronite leaders. But clerical support also produced complaints that the mobilization effort served sectarian agendas, particularly among émigré Sunnis and Druze, for whom continuing loyalty to the Ottoman empire's ruling party combined with a distrust of foreign ambitions in Syria. 65 Their fears about sectarian discord linked directly to larger anxieties about foreign (particularly French) interference in Ottoman politics. 66 The diaspora's experience with military mobilization also created significant political fissures between rival recruiters and among Syrian immigrant troops. The most common source of conflict lay in recruiters' preferences of foreign allies, as rival groups of Syrianists, Lebanists, and Arab nationalists each sought to raise their profile in Wilson's army. 67 In New York City, 71 He required all foreign-language publications to remit regular English translations to his office for inspection, and al-Fatat's failure to do so in Bakhash's absence led to his indictment for sedition, along with two colleagues, Ilya Abu Madi (also at al-Fatat) and ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad (editor of al-Saʾih). 72 Bakhash rushed home from Argentina to sort out the matter, leaving his recruits behind. He was later acquitted after Tabet prevailed on the French ambassador, Jean Jusserand, to write the US Department of State on his behalf. 73 Syrian and Lebanese immigrants who joined the US army were, without exception, sent to France. Despite recruiters' description of the European front as a valid theatre in the war against the Ottomans, they faced ongoing pressure to facilitate the work of true auto-emancipation. Returning from a recruitment trip to Brazil in late 1917, Bakhash concluded that 'it is significant and important that Syrians may struggle for their own emancipation from the Turkish yoke' rather than awaiting liberation at the hands of European powers. 74 Syrian battle deaths in faraway places such as the Somme and Château-Thierry weighed heavily on him. He feared that the 'unacknowledged and uncounted disappearance' of Syrian war dead in the mass carnage dissolved their symbolic significance and undermined the political contract he believed Syrians had made with America. 75 Even as recruiters scoured the Americas looking for eligible young men, they lobbied for two changes in army policy to enhance Syrians' visibility: an end to the five-year residency period, which discouraged some Syrian declarants from volunteering, and a reconsideration of the US stance on irregular corps of co-ethnic immigrants. Although the US army refused to loosen its eligibility requirements for foreign-born soldiers in 1917, circumstances changed dramatically the following year. What had seemed like an elegant classification system dividing immigrants into declarants, non-declarants, and ineligible aliens instead proved to be a messy, unworkable albatross. Because the Selective Service Act required all immigrant men to register despite their actual eligibility, hundreds of thousands of ineligible aliens were mistakenly drafted into the army, among them thousands of Ottoman subjects. Some filed grievances through the foreign consular system; in the United States, the Spanish Consulate handled exemption claims on behalf of Ottoman immigrants. 76 But the exemption process was difficult and required drafted men to actively petition for exemption. Exemption fraud also became a problem. 77 If some immigrants used forged papers to claim exemption from the draft, many more opted to serve despite being legally ineligible; Nancy Ford enumerates some 191,000 illegal US army enlistments by the war's end. 78 Meanwhile, ethnic leaders in several immigrant communities pushed for a loosening of restrictions, and mainstream American nativists complained about 'alien slackers' who had been excused from military service. 79 Congress revisited the issue of immigrant military service in 1918, drafting a new law that waived the five-year residency requirement for immigrant volunteers in the armed forces. The 9 May 1918 Act entitles all aliens in the service (including enemy aliens) to citizenship whether they have their first papers or not … Before the application is granted, however, it should be understood that the application is wholly voluntary and is a privilege which can only be granted to those producing evidence of loyalty … When the application is granted, the soldier will immediately become a citizen, with all privileges and immunities of citizenship.
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This instantaneous citizenship was available only to immigrant soldiers, but regardless of declarancy or nationality status. A single witness, usually the recruit's commanding officer, was the army's standard for 'evidence of loyalty'. After signing a naturalization petition and a loyalty oath renouncing their previous nationality, the soldiers proceeded to base camp as new American citizens. The recruitment process was almost invariably managed by newspaper editors and other nationalist elites, but Syrian enlistees represented the full spectrum of the diaspora's working and middle classes. Most of the men whom Shakir and al-Khuri levied in 1918 were textile workers from New England, and improved access to US citizenship appealed more to Syrian proletarians than it did to the peddlers, merchants, and intellectuals who dominate studies of the Syrian diaspora. A boom in the American textile industry just prior to the war led many Syrian men into industrial weaving, leatherworking, and heavy manufacturing. Cash wages in these industries had reached an all-time high, but unnaturalized Syrian workers also found themselves underpaid relative to naturalized immigrant workers. First-time army privates earned only US$15 a month, a paltry sum compared to the US$25-30 that skilled textile workers made. But Syrian enlistees who fulfilled at least one term in the army could then make use of their new citizenship status to obtain higher wages at the factories that 78 The US army also revised its policies regarding ethnic corps in mid 1918. Historically the Americans had resisted the use of irregular legions like the French Légion d'Orient because of concerns about the diplomatic entanglements that such units could produce. An early effort to levy an all-Syrian legion in Fall River, Massachusetts, failed to secure army approval. In this small mill town in 1917, a naturalized army veteran named Mitri Jabbur raised an informal column of 300 Syrian men running daily drills at the police academy. It is unclear whether Sgt Jabbur had army authorization, but Fall River's municipal authorities endorsed the project as a show of immigrant patriotism. In his appeal to the US army's Provost Marshall, Sgt Jabbur stated that his goal was deployment to Mount Lebanon. Upon learning of the exercises, General Crowder instead ordered the corps to be disbanded. The 9 May 1918 Act prompted the US army to experiment with a variety of ethnic legions for the first time, changing the nature of immigrant mobilization as Syrians motivated by a desire to renounce their Ottoman nationality and gain US citizenship joined in larger numbers. In the summer of 1918, eight new battalions began training at Camp Devens in Massachusetts. 89 The regiments -Italian, Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, Greek, Albanian, Syrian, and
Armenian -trained and spoke in their own languages and were comprised entirely of immigrants given naturalization in return for service. 90 Sergeant James Habib ʿAttara, a leatherworker originally from Aleppo, presided over the Syrian column. ʿAttara's group was earmarked for France, but did not deploy because the war ended before they completed training. The Syrian legion's naturalization paperwork was so hastily drawn up (and so slowly processed) that many of the men training under ʿAttara formally remained Ottoman subjects until after the Armistice. Sgt ʿAttara's own citizenship papers, for instance, were not processed until 22 November 1918, two weeks after the end of the First World War. 91 The hajj to break the German empire: Syrian soldiers on the Western Front
Despite the recruitment obstacles that Ottoman immigrants faced, many Syrians and Lebanese successfully enlisted and deployed to Europe under French, Canadian, British, and American flags. The Syrian press in the diaspora printed their images, biographies, and letters, eagerly documenting Syrians on their 'hajj to break the German empire'. 92 A genre emerged that folded soldiers' stories into a pervasive narrative about Syrian liberation from abroad, ultimately serving the ends of recruiters and a variety of émigré nationalists. But Syrian and Lebanese deployment experiences illustrate a variety of responses to life in combat, undermining the confident patriotism imposed on them by the press abroad. Mounting casualties, the drudgery of trench life, and brazen attempts by nationalists to appropriate the soldiers as symbols for their political projects indelibly marked recruits' perspectives of the war. For them, the simultaneity of 'Syrian' and 'American' patriotism -so important during the enlistment process -began to break down. Writing home from the Western Front, deployed Syrians frequently reported their discovery of compatriots on the battlefield. Sometimes this was a source of glee: in late 1915, Gabriel Ward reported to Ibrahim al-Khuri and the Fatat Boston newspaper that some of the Syrians fighting in Britain's regiments were Ottoman draft-dodgers who had fled Mount Lebanon early in the war and 'had been offered refuge in Britain' in return for their service. 93 Though few in numbers, Ottoman army deserters who joined the Entente gave the Syrian press a powerful symbol for émigré partnerships against Istanbul. Discussions about the empire's eroding military morale accompanied images of Syrian troops and advertisements calling for recruits. 94 To Among soldiers, the experience of recruitment, enlistment, and deployment effectively changed what it meant to be 'Syrian' or 'Lebanese' as opposed to Ottoman subjects abroad. By 1918, new national signifiers took on increasingly more rigid ideological content. At the same time, soldiers' writings betrayed a countervailing resistance to nationalist ideas, as well as a mounting belief among the men that the war would destroy, not create, new nations. The war's global character and the Western Front's massive mortality alienated Syrian troops from the nationalist goals reported by activists abroad. In his memoirs, Ward recounted the combat death of a close companion from his regiment, Jibraʾil Bishara from Mount Lebanon. Ward and Bishara had travelled together from New York to Canada to enlist in 1915. Ward recalled his eagerness to 'to complete the salvation of Syrians and Lebanese from the suffering of this war' as they arrived in northern France in January 1916. 99 Bishara had been 'the first to charge into the battlefield', where he instantly sustained a mortal shrapnel wound to the neck. As he lay dying in a field hospital, his final thoughts were taken down by Ward. These he sent to the 
Conclusion
The First World War ended in the Ottoman empire's defeat in October 1918, and with Syria's occupation by British, French, and Arab troops. The League of Nations announced that it would preside over the post-war settlement process at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and dozens of émigré recruiters-turned-nationalists shifted focus from mobilizing the diaspora's military manpower to harnessing its representative voice through extensive petition campaigns. 110 In their production, circulation, and presentation to the Great Powers, petitions on the 'Syrian Question' followed the same routes that once delivered Syrian troops to enlistment centres. Often, these documents passed through the same networks of men whose hands had stamped foreign passports, drawn up naturalization papers, and provided steamship tickets to emigrant troops one year earlier. Through a fragmentary archival record and the reportage from the Arabic press, this article has captured what Syrian diasporic mobilization looked like from the inside, through the eyes of recruiters and their emigrant charges. It has argued that the mobilization effort depended on a flexible, multivalent discourse about patriotism, responsibility, and obligation that spoke to emigrants as both Syrians and Americans. Recruiters built into their work with the US army the expectation that the use of Syrian troops would lead to an American endorsement of Syrian aspirations for independence. In the end, these expectations were sorely frustrated: an emigrant bid for a US mandate over Syria and Lebanon failed to capture the attentions of American policymakers, and France prepared the ground to impose a League of Nations mandate in 1920. 111 As for the Syrian immigrant veterans who served, most of them secured American
